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ARGUMENT 
I. L&T PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER, UNDER THE UCC, A 
LEGAL DUTY WAS OWED TO CHECK CITY. 
Check City concedes that given the facts of this case, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-
406, "does not create a cause of action for Check City" Check City Br. 14. By such 
concession, Check City recognizes that the trial court erred in applying section 3-406 as 
the legal basis for the specified duty owed by L&T to Check City. Check City argues, 
however, that L&T did not properly preserve the issue of "duty under 3-406" before the 
trial court. (Check City Br. 8). Check City's argument is without merit. 
Check City argues that because L&T never specifically referenced section 3-406 
during the course of the trial, the issue of whether the trial court properly applied section 
3-406, was not preserved for appeal. Check City's argument improperly seeks to shift the 
burden of proving each element of its claimed cause of action from Check City as 
plaintiff in the underlying action, to the defendant L&T. It is well recognized that a 
plaintiff asserting a negligence cause of action has the burden to establish the legal basis 
for the duty asserted against the defendant. See e.g. Payne v. Meyers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 
(Utah 1987). Check City's argument would effectively require any defendant wherein a 
general claim of negligence has been asserted against it, to speculate and attempt to 
create a record specific to any statutory provision that might be construed as a basis for 
the plaintiffs negligence cause of action. The impossibility of such burden is emphasized 
by the fact that Check City did not once mention at trial that the basis of its negligence 
claim rested on section 3-406. 
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endorsement. (R. 439). 
Apparently recognizing that section 3-406 of Utah's Commercial Code "does not 
create a cause of action for Check City" (Check City Br. 14), throughout the course of 
the trial Check City did not once argue that the basis of the claimed duty owed by L&T 
arose under section 3-406. L&T on the other hand, consistently argued that "there is no 
duty imposed under the Uniform Commercial Code associated with this particular 
relationship" including Article 3. (Tr. 32; see also R. 437-42; 499; Tr. 30 - "there's no 
duty owed to Check City;" Tr. 140 - "under the joint check law, as we *ve referenced 
here, the loss falls with Check City who took the [Joint Checks without] endorsement, 
there is no duty under the law"). Perhaps most importantly, it is also clear that the trial 
court recognized L&T's position and that the issue of any duty under the Uniform 
Commercial Code was squarely before the trial court. At the very outset of the trial and 
while addressing the issues to be considered at trial, the court emphasized that "fojf 
course, L&T disputes any duty"( Tr. 4 (emphasis added)). 
Although Check City initially argues in its brief that L&T failed to adequately 
preserve the issue of duty under section 3-406 (Check City Br. 8-11), in its next 
argument, Check City admits that "L&T argued [before the trial court] there was no duty 
under the UCC." (Check City Br. 12). Based on this admission and the express references 
to the issue throughout the course of the trial, Check City's assertion that the issue of 
whether a legal duty existed under Utah's Commercial Code (including section 3-406), 
was not sufficiently preserved is without merit. 
In addition to the relevant legal authority set forth in L&T's Motion in Limine and 
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the case and trial. (E.g. R.9 Check City's complaint includes the admission that "[the 
Joint Checks] were returned because they only had one of two required endorsements "); 
Tr. 3-4 (the trial court recognizing that "there is very little factual dispute" and that "the 
checks were not endorsed"); Tr. 5 (Check City's counsel acknowledging that the Joint 
Checks were missing an endorsement); Tr. 30-31 (the trial court acknowledging as true 
that it was "undisputed" Check City had accepted the Joint Checks without proper 
endorsement); Tr. 31 (the trial court recognizing "These [Joint Checks] didn 't have two 
endorsements. There was one endorsement. ... Those are facts that I don't think are 
disputed")', Tr. 123-24 (L&T's counsel emphasizing that there was no dispute that 
Familian as one of the joint payees had not endorsed the Joint Checks, whereupon Check 
City's counsel admits "never disputed that")). Based on Check City's clear admissions, 
there can be no dispute that the Joint Checks did not involve a forgery or alteration as 
contemplated by 3-406. Accordingly, Check City should not now be heard to argue that 
L&T "never argued that there was not a forgery" (Check City Br. 8), or that L&T failed 
to marshal the evidence that might lead to a "determination] that there was a forgery." 
(Check City Br. 11, 13). 
Based on the foregoing, L&T respectfully submits, that the issue of whether a duty 
under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-406, was owed by L&T to Check City given the 
undisputed facts of this case, is properly before this Court. 
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II. CHECK CITY CONFUSES THE APPLICATION OF A "FORGED 
SIGNATURE" UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-406, WITH 
CIRCUMSTANCES INVOVLING A MISSING OR FORGED 
ENDORSEMENT. 
Check City next contends that if L&T would have made the argument at trial that 
the Joint Checks did not involve a forged signature, then "Check City would have 
presented additional evidence of the [endorsements] being forgeries." (Check City Br. 
13). Again. Check City appears to be asking this Court to shift the burden of establishing 
all elements of Check City's negligence theories. As previously cited, such an attempt 
ignores well recognized principles that the party asserting a negligence claim has the 
burden of establishing the legal basis for the duty being asserted. See e.g. Payne v. 
Meyers, at 188. More importantly, Check City's assertion that it would have presented 
evidence that the endorsements on the checks were forgeries belies Check City's 
numerous admissions that the Joint Checks involved a missing endorsement. Supra. 
Finally, Check City's argument reflects Check City's misunderstanding relative to the 
application of section 3-406. 
The reference to a "forged signature" within 3-406 does not extend to a case 
involving a "forged endorsement." (L&T Br. 17-18). See e.g., Chow v. Enterprise Bank 
& Trust Co., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. No. 31, 795, 797 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing that reference 
to "forged signature" in section 3-406, has no application to a case involving a missing, 
unauthorized or forged endorsement). Thus, even if Check City had not made clear 
admissions and had also sought to "present additional evidence" that the Joint Checks 
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contained a forged endorsement, section 3-406 would have no application and could not 
be the legal basis for any duty owed under the circumstances of this case. Such 
conclusion is acknowledged by Check City in recognizing the "numerous authorities 
which hold that a check which is missing fan endorsement] does not contain a forgery or 
alteration under U.C.C. § 3-406." (Check City Br. 13). 
III. THE UTAH COMMERICAL CODE CONTROLS THE DETERMINATION 
OF WHETHER A DUTY WAS OWED BETWEEN CHECK CITY AND 
L&T. 
Check City next concedes that section "3-406 does not create a cause of action for 
Check City/' (Check City Br. 14). However, Check City then attempts to ignore the trial 
court's clear application of 3-406 as the basis for the legal duty imposed upon L&T. In 
doing so, Check City appears to suggest that the trial court's legal conclusion should be 
upheld based on a general, but unspecified duty of "reasonable" or "ordinary care." 
(Check City Br. 14-15). In doing so, Check City cites no authority for the proposition 
that the provisions of the UCC should be superceded by an unspecified duty of 
reasonable care. 
It is well recognized that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
supercede and even preempt common law claims when the allowance of such claims 
would otherwise thwart the purposes of the Code. See e.g. Bradley v. First Nat. Bank of 
Walker, N.A., 711 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Minn. App., 2006) (discussing various state court 
decisions that recognize the principle that the UCC preempts common law claims that are 
inconsistent with the provisions of the UCC). Check City's assertion of an unspecified 
and general duty owed by L&T to Check City when it is undisputed that Check City 
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negotiated the Joint Checks without requiring both joint payee's endorsements, is wholly 
inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-110(4) which states in the pertinent part: "If 
an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of 
them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them." (Emphasis 
supplied). By allowing check cashing institutions like Check City to ignore the direction 
of the maker to 'pay to the order' of the named payees, and then sue the maker under 
unspecified common law negligence theories, would effectively nullify the application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-110(4). 
As more fully set forth in L&T's opening brief and not addressed by Check City in 
its responsive brief, recognition of Check City's "ordinary care" theory against L&T 
would also nullify the "joint check rule" recognized in Sfr, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2008 UT 
App 31, 177 P.3d 629 (Utah Ct. App., 2008). L&T Br. 20. The imposition of a 
negligence standard not otherwise recognized or contemplated by the UCC would 
eliminate the "protection" otherwise contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-110(4), 
as well as the "widespread practice in the construction industry that allows owners and 
general contractors to protect themselves" through the issuance of joint checks. Sfr, 
Inc., Ml P.3d at 636. See also Pacific Metals Co., 446 P.2d at 305 (emphasizing that it is 
"elementary negotiable instruments law" that [Check City] was "not entitled to pay the 
check without the endorsement of the copayee"). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S PROXIMATE CAUSE DETERMINATION MAY 
BE REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
WELL RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY. 
To the extent this Court determines that the trial court properly imposed a general 
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duty of care on L&T as the maker of the Joint Checks, and that such duty exists 
notwithstanding Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-110(4) and the "joint check rule," Check 
City's admitted negligence in paying on the Joint Checks without both endorsements of 
the copayees, supercedes as a matter of law any comparative negligence on the part of 
L&T. In response to the foregoing argument set forth in L&T's opening brief (L&T Br. 
21-24), Check City does not discuss or even attempt to distinguish the numerous cases 
and authority cited therein. (Check City Br. 15-16). Rather, Check City asserts that the 
issue of "comparative negligence" is a fact question subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. Id. Check City relies on the case of State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994) (a case addressing the standard of review appropriate to reasonable-suspicion 
determinations). In applying the analysis in the Pena case to the instant case, however, a 
trial court's determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to a proximate 
cause determination is more appropriately reviewed "nondeferentially for correctness." 
Id at 939. See also, Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 
1985) ("an actual cause-effect relationship" is a legal conclusion to be reviewed for 
correctness). 
Check City then points to factors that should have caused L&T to be suspicious of 
TJS (the subcontractor and one of the copayees on the Joint Checks). For purposes of this 
appeal, L&T does not dispute that as the maker of the Joint Checks, it might have been 
more diligent in seeking to obtain copies of the Joint Checks from the depository bank so 
as to verify the existence of both copayee endorsements. However, the trial court's 
determination that L&T was the proximate cause of Check City's damage ignores the 
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well recognized principle that the party in the best position to prevent the harm ought to 
bear the loss. Pacific Metals, 446 P.2d at 306. As previously set forth, L&T's opening 
brief further discusses the numerous cases in support of the forgoing principle and Check 
City's only response is to argue that such cases are "distinguishable" because such cases 
involve instances where a joint check was missing an endorsement. As previously set 
forth, Check City admitted throughout the course of trial and the trial court expressly 
acknowledged that this case indisputably involved a situation where the Joint Checks 
were missing the required endorsement of a copayee. See L&T's previous discussion and 
citation to the record supra at Argument "I." For Check City to assert that such cases are 
"distinguishable" from the instant case because herein one of the copayees endorsed the 
Joint Checks both as an individual and with the company name, belies the multiple 
admissions during trial that Familian never endorsed the Joint Checks and is therefore 
without merit. 
Because Check City failed to fulfill its "duty to comply with the direction of the 
maker to pay to the order of the named payees" {Pacific Metals at 306), such act of 
negligence was an "independent intervening cause and therefore the sole proximate 
cause" of Check City's damages. Waiters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981) 
(citation omitted). 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF L&T'S COUNTERCLAIM WAS 
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND DID NOT TAKE INTO 
CONSIDERATION THE VERIFIED PLEADINGS IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF. 
Check City initially argues that L&T did not adequately preserve for appeal the 
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dismissal of L&T's counterclaim. (Check City Br. 17-18). Check City seems to assert 
that L&T should have put on specific evidence of L&T's damage claim during the course 
of the trial, even though the trial court had previously dismissed L&T's counterclaim 
when it granted Check City's Motion for Summary Judgment on such counterclaim. (R. 
334). Check City's argument ignores the effect of the trial court's dispositive dismissal of 
L&T's counterclaim. Simply put, once the trial court dismissed L&T's counterclaim, 
there was no claim to ''preserve for appeal." The counterclaim was dismissed and L&T 
was precluded from further pursing the claim. 
Check City then argues that L&T's verified pleadings setting forth the amount 
L&T was obligated to pay as a result of Check City's failure to obtain both copayee 
endorsements did not contain "specific facts" setting forth an adequate explanation of 
such payment. (Check City Br. 19). As set forth in L&T's opening brief the applicable 
standard is whether the verified pleadings before the trial court created a "plausible 
inference" in favor of L&T regarding the damage arising from Check City's failure to 
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-110(4) (an instrument payable to two or more 
persons may be "negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them"). 
L&T's Verified Counterclaim provides record evidence that after Check City 
failed to require both co-payee endorsements, L&T was required to pay Familian the sum 
of $39,900.34. (R. 73). L&T's Verified Memorandum further provides that this amount 
was $20,592.22 more than L&T would have otherwise had to pay Familian, but for 
Check City's negligence. (R. 298). The verified pleadings before the trial court supported 
a "plausible inference" in favor of L&T regarding the alleged damages arising from 
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Check City's negligence. See Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786, 790 
(Utah 2008). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, L&T respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's judgment in favor of Check City and reinstate L&T's previously dismissed 
counterclaim. 
DATED this jZday of March, 2010. 
Steven F. Alh4d 
Jim F. Lundberg 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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